Course Description
Leaders of governments are often required to make decisions under conditions that are time-constrained, stressful, and where the stakes are very high. Think of the Cuban Missile Crisis, in which decisions needed to be made quickly in a context that risked nuclear war, the United States after 9/11, Ukraine and Russia, or Israel after October 7, 2023.
Psychological research tells us that rather than behaving as rational actors, individual and collective history and memory influence leaders’ decisions in such circumstances. First, personal and collective history and memory contribute to leaders’ personalities and traits. Second, history and memory have a direct influence through their use in analogical reasoning—the inference that the current crisis is similar to a previous crisis. They help leaders to diagnose the seriousness of what is at stake and seem to offer clues as to the effective (and ineffective) courses of action. Third, prospect theory says that history and memory affect how leaders frame situations in terms of gains and losses, leading them to be risk averse or risk acceptant.
But cognitive psychology also tells us that these memories and “lessons of history” are often used poorly by leaders because they are swayed by the superficial similarities between one situation and another, or take risks to get back to a historical status quo that is unreachable. Indeed, the poor use of history often results in leaders making suboptimal decisions.
This course will begin by looking at the psychology of elite decision-making in terms of the influence of history and memory on the development of leaders’ personalities and traits, in analogical reasoning, and according to prospect theory. The course will then consider other psychological perspectives on elite decision-making that regard history and memory as less influential, including groupthink, in which the emphasis is on the structural flaws of groups and the perils of concurrence-seeking, and poliheuristic theory, in which political considerations are said to eliminate consideration of some options entirely, with leaders then deciding rationally between the options that remain. Finally, we will ask whether (and how) these different perspectives on elite decision-making can be combined, and how we might ensure that leaders use history and memory more productively in decision-making.
The course will draw on several different leaders, cases and historical examples from the 20th and 21st centuries around the world.

Learning outcomes of the course
Upon successful completion of this course, students should be able to:
(1) discuss the major theories of elite thinking and decision-making in the field of political psychology in oral and written work, and the role of history and memory in them
(2) apply and evaluate psychological theories of elite thinking and decision-making in presentations and written work.
(3) synthesize and critique major theories and arguments in the field.
(4) critically evaluate the implications of new research and evidence for a given theory.

Syllabus

Psychological theories involving history and memory
• Psychobiography
• Leadership Trait Analysis and Operational Codes
• The Big 5
• Analogical reasoning and the past
• Prospect theory and elites’ reference points
Alternative psychological theories
• Groupthink
• Prospect theory
Combining psychological theories
• Personality and groupthink
• Cognitive complexity and analogical reasoning

Teaching Assessment
This course will be assessed by a combination of:
Class participation (20%): asking questions (in-class or by email before class), answering questions in class, discussing readings.
Presentations (12 minutes + Q&A) (40%): Students will be given the opportunity to choose a leader and a decision that interests them. They will prepare a presentation that evaluates the leader and decision in terms of the theories we examine.
Final exam of 1.5 hours (40%): consisting of multiple-choice questions and two essay questions requiring knowledge of the material in the course.

Bibliography/Recommended Reading
Brown, Lauren, Laszlo Horvath, and Daniel Stevens. 2021. “Moonshots or a Cautious Take-off? How the Big 5 Leadership Traits Predict Covid-19 Policy Response.” Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties S1: 335-347.
Houghton, David Patrick. 1996. “The Role of Analogical Reasoning in Novel Foreign Policy Situations.” British Journal of Political Science 25: 523-552.
Kertzer, Joshua, and Dustin Tingley. 2018. “Political Psychology in International Relations: Beyond the Paradigms.” Annual Review of Political Science 21: 1-23.
Khong, Yuen Foong. 1992. Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Langenbacher, Eric, and Ruth Witllinger. 2018. “The End of Memory? German-American Relations under Donald Trump.” German Politics 27: 174-192.
Lee, Tony. 2020. “Groupthink, Qualitative Comparative Analysis, and the 1989 Tiananmen Square Disaster.” Small Group Research 51: 435-463.
McDermott, Rose. 2004. Political Psychology in International Relations. Michigan: University of Michigan Press.
Pursiainen, Christer, and Tuomas Forsberg. 2021. The Psychology of Foreign Policy. London: Palgrave.
Miller, Paul. 2016. “Graveyard of Analogies: The Use and Abuse of History for the War in Afghanistan.” Journal of Strategic Studies 39: 446-476.
Oktay, Sibel. Forthcoming. “Crisis Leadership in the Time of Covid: Effects of Personality Traits on Response Speed.” International Studies Perspectives
Satterfield, Jason. 1998. “Cognitive-Affective States Predict Military and Political Aggression and Risk Taking: A Content Analysis of Churchill, Hitler, Roosevelt, and Stalin.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 42: 667-690.

Last updated: July 16, 2025