Bounded rationality and paternalism: description
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Prof. Dr. Wilhelm Vossenkuhl,
Prof. Dr. Ulrich Scroth
One currently highly influential strategy to justify paternalistic measures is based on the findings of behavioural and cognitive sciences. It claims to be compatible with a generally liberal view and argues that people rarely behave rationally – when their behaviour is compared to the standard by classical rational choice theory – , but, to a large extent, quasi-rationally: Their choices and even their preferences depend on effects of framing, anchoring, status quo bias etc. Consequently, in many areas, the choices and preferences are inevitably affected by how the state sets up decision situations for its citizens, and, it is argued, these inevitable regulations should be paternalistic. Furthermore, the systematic deviation of people’s decisions from the standard of classical rational choice theory, seems to invite additional paternalistic measures both to optimize rationality and to avoid non-rational choices that are harmful, or to ‘correct’ ‘adaptive’ preferences which have been formed as a result of repressive socialization. 
The aim of the seminar is to put this approach under critical scrutiny. Even if the decision patterns of persons are, generally, quasi-rational rather than rational in the classical sense, it is not clear, what normative consequences are to be drawn from this result. After presenting central exponents of the behavioural law and economics approach, both critical voices from the legal camp and from the philosophical camp will be examined; especially, it will be asked, how far bounded rationality raises difficulties for classical accounts of autonomy. Eventually, it will be attempted to develop a new, more differentiated model of justifying paternalistic measures, which incorporates the insights of behavioural law and economics. 
