April 26 - 30, 2007. Right-based theories of morals and law, and weak paternalism
| Kant’s strongly antipaternalistic theory of rights | |
| - Kant’s moral theory - Kant’s concept of law - The overall antipaternalism of Kant’s legal theory |
|
| Consent-based strategies of justifying (weakly) paternalistic measures | |
| - Rawls’ ‘insurance scheme’ strategy - VanDeVeer on hypothetical individualized consent - Kleinig’s argument from personal integrity |
|
| ‘Protecting the agent’s future autonomy’. The classical problem cases for anti-paternalism | |
| - Autonomy-enhancement justifications for paternalistic measures - The inherent slide towards perfectionism (Raz) - Can one coherently ‘play off’ future autonomy vs. present freedom of decision. Alternative conceptions of human identity (Parfit, Buchanan) |
|
| Alternative professedly ‘antipaternalistic’ strategies to justify paternalistic measures | |
| Is overall rejection of weak paternalism coherent with our conception of rational agency? | |
| - Requirements of internal rationality for intentional actions (Brock) - Substantial requirements on autonomy, esp. principled autonomy accounts (O’Neill) |
|
Contact
Chiara Bianchini - LMU Seminars Coordinator