Social Simulation: readings
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Paolo Pellizzari, Università Ca' Foscari Venezia
- Arthur, B. (1989). Competing technologies, increasing returns, and lock-in by historical events. The Economic Journal, 99:116-131.
- Arthur, B. (1994). Inductive reasoning and bounded rationality. The American Economic Review, 84:606-611.
- Ashlock, D. (2006). Evolutionary computation for modeling and optimization. Springer, New York.
- Batten, D. (2000). Discovering artificial economics. Westview Press.
- Bloomquist, K. (2006). A comparison of agent-based models of income tax evasion. Social Science Computer Review, 24:411-425.
- Epstein, J. (2001). Learning to be thoughtless: Social norms and individual computation. Computational Economics, 18:9-24.
- Epstein, J. (2002). Modeling civil violence: an agent-based computational approach. PNAS, 99:7243-7250.
- Galam, S. (2002). Modeling rumors: the no plane pentagon french hoax case. Technical report, arXiv:cond-mat/0211571.
- Granovetter, M. (1978). Threshold models of collective behavior. American Journal of Sociology, 83:1420-1443.
- Kirman, A. (1993). Ants, rationality, and recruitment. Q. J. Econ., 108:137-156.
- Miller, J. and Page, S. (2004). The standing ovation problem. Complexity, 9:8-16.
- Mitteldorf, J. and Wilson, D. (2000). Population viscosity and evolution of altruism. J. Theor. Biology, 204:481-496.
- Nagurney, A. (2000). Congested urban transportation networks and emission paradoxes. Transportation Research Part D: Transport and Environment, 5(2):145-151.
- Nagurney, A. (2001). Paradoxes in networks with zero emission links: implications for telecommunications versus transportation. Transportation Research Part D: Transport and Environment, 6(4):283-296.
- Rauch, J. (2002). Seeing around corners. The Atlantic Monthly, 289:35-48.
